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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/05/2006 Accident number: 158 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 23/07/1997 
Where it occurred: Qalai Muslim Village, 
Ward 7, Kabul 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Tripwire accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: IED Ground condition: hard 
residential/urban 
Date record created: 14/02/2004 Date  last modified: 14/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
vegetation clearance problem (?) 
request for machine to assist (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 




At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for five years. It was two months since his last revision course 
and 26 days since his last leave. The accident occurred in a residential area with hard ground 
conditions. A photograph showed no vegetation. No parts of the device were found and it was 
presumed to have been a booby trap.  
The investigators determined that the victim was clearing a portion of the minefield with 
bushes, grass and defensive wire. While he was searching for a tripwire with the feeler, the 
deminer set off a tripwire-controlled device with the feeler. He was not wearing a helmet and 
visor at the time. 
The Team Leader said that the victim used his tripwire feeler improperly. He also said, "if we 
had more developed and modern equipment…we would be able to prevent such accidents". 
The Section Leader said that the victim did not look carefully enough before using the feeler. 
He added that "in areas where booby traps and other dangerous mines are laid, the most 
developed and modern equipment is needed". 
The victim's partner said that the victim did not use the feeler properly – he also said that 
"more developed and modern" equipment would prevent such injury. 
The victim said he had been working properly but has removed the helmet because it was 




The investigators concluded that the accident occurred because of deminer carelessness and 
the injuries to his eyes resulted because he did not wear the helmet and visor. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that extra care should be taken when working in complicated 
areas and that tripwire feelers should be used very smoothly in bushy areas. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 202 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: no 
Compensation: 375,000 Rs Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: none 
 











See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as minor injuries to his knees, eyes and face.  
A photograph showed both hands bandaged and his right shoulder and left wrist bandaged. 
A medic's sketch (reproduced below) showed extensive frag/lacerations to his left leg and 
arm, frag/lacerations of lower right leg, a shoulder injury and lacerations and fragment injuries 
on the face.  
 
 
The demining group reported that the victim had suffered foreign bodies to both eyes, multiple 
lacerations to his face, upper lip, left arm, left hand, left leg and right knee joint. 
In December 1997 they described his permanent injuries as: vision loss both eyes, hearing 
loss left ear. His hearing loss was assessed as 50% on 22nd November 1997. The injuries to 
his right hand and left arm were assessed as a 15% disability on 3rd December 1997. His 
vision loss was assessed at 85% on 2nd December 1998.  
Compensation of 375,000 Rs was paid on 30th March 1998. 
3 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was not wearing his visor and the error went uncorrected. Other errors may have been 
similarly uncorrected.   
Although the victim said he had removed the helmet and visor because of heat, it is possible 
that the victim did not wear the visor correctly because it was too damaged to see through 
properly (as was seen frequently during field visits in 1998, 1999), in which case the 
management's failure to provide useable equipment represents a serious management 
failing. Similarly, the issue of inappropriate handtools was a significant management failing. 
The victim's severe deafness is common in Afghan claims from this period, when insurance 
favoured such injury and testing the validity of claims was hard.   
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
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